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This paper presents four case studies that explore the 
adoption and acceptance of mobile technologies and 
services within the context of the privacy-value-control 
(PVC) trichotomy. The technologies studied include: 
the mobile phone, electronic toll payment tags, e-
passports, and loyalty card programs. The study shows 
that despite the potential barriers to adoption in each 
of the depicted cases, the applications were embraced 
with great success soon after their introduction. An 
understanding of why these mobile innovations 
succeeded in spite of the concerns surrounding them 
will serve to help practitioners understand other issues 
currently plaguing emerging technologies like radio-
frequency identification (RFID) tags and transponders. 
The contribution of this paper is not only in its usage 
of secondary sources to support case development and 
subsequent cross-case analysis but on the importance 
of emphasizing the value proposition to the consumer 
to ensure the success of an innovation. The PVC 
trichotomy emphasizes the need to harmonize privacy, 
value and control. 
 
1. Introduction 
Surrounding the invention of every new information 
and communication technology (ICT) are a myriad of 
challenges that need to be resolved so that the 
innovation will not fall by the wayside. For example, 
some technologies face technical limitations, while 
others face consumer backlash. This paper uses a new 
paradigm to investigate mobile innovations- the 
privacy-value-control trichotomy. While themes of 
privacy and control have been addressed in the 
literature, the value proposition of a given service has 
only been considered within a business context. The 
four mobile business applications explored in this 
investigation include location-based services (LBS), e-
tollway, e-passport and loyalty programs. In each case 
the key research issues are identified and discussed. 
The main question asked is why innovations that have 
endured such difficult beginnings- in terms of 
consumer acceptance- have gone on to become 
engrained in our everyday lives. 
 
2. Definitions 
The concept of value is an all-encompassing term 
which references the value proposition a technology or 
service affords the end user. Whilst many analyze 
technologies in terms of benefits or simply 
convenience, the value proposition is an equation of all 
the positive factors that interest the individual. It can 
include cost savings, time reductions, efficiency, 
personalization, safety and security, as well as 
convenience and other tangible and intangible benefits. 
All the case studies that will be discussed in this paper 
provide some form of value to the end user.  
Understanding this value is critical in examining how it 
affects acceptance given the inherent privacy threats 
that the technology may impose. Privacy refers to the 
information privacy needs of consumers. Of primary 
concern in regard to RFID usage in retail, is the 
collection of personal information that pertains to 
consumer shopping preferences, actions and behavior. 
It is the collection, use and disclosure of this 
information, particularly when it may be incorrect or 
unverified, to track and monitor individuals without 
their awareness or express approval, that is commonly 
recognized as one of the most prominent threats. This 
privacy concern is similar across all the case studies to 
be explored in this paper, which will again provide an 
important platform for assessing how value and privacy 
is related. Finally, the dimension of control is another 
important variable in consumer acceptance of 
technologies. It relates to the individual’s ability to 
control the information that is collected and stored by 
the technology or its ability to record, track or identify 
that individual’s actions. The level of control that is 
provided either inherently through the technology or by 
the service provider, whether that be perceived or real, 
is seen as an important element that, when combined 
with the value proposition, can affect consumer 
acceptance. Interestingly, the case studies to be 
discussed all provide different means or levels of 
control in regard to end users and their privacy. 
 
2.1 Key works 
There was a scarcity of holistic qualitative and 
quantitative studies for review. Studies either addressed 
privacy, value and control separately, or no more than 
two of these concepts [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Key quantitative 
studies reviewed for this work are shown in Table 1, 
alongside the respective key outcomes. 
 





Regardless of which privacy-




Consumers understood the value 
proposition but were still concerned 
about privacy implications. 
(Ng-Kruelle, 
Swatman, Hampe & 
Rebne, 2006) 
Cultural dimensions affect the way in 
which consumers view the privacy 
threat. 
(Ng-Kruelle, 
Swatman, Rebne & 
Hampe, 2002) 
Consumers feel a lack of control over 
the technology and a great power 
distance. 
 
3. Case 1: Mobile phone 
Cellular coverage is now accessible by 80 percent of 
the world’s population of over six billion, and over 90 
percent will have coverage by 2010 [6]. The actual 
number of mobile phone users is estimated to be 
around 1.8 billion, which equates to a global 
penetration rate of nearly 28% [7]. In developing 
countries where mobile communications allow them to 
“leapfrog” traditional wired telephony networks, 
growth rates are staggering. Between 1998 and 2003, 
mobile phone usage exploded in Africa by 5000% [8]. 
Similarly, India and China are now being viewed as 
potential “cash cows” for the industry, where the sheer 
number of potential subscribers is seen as a highly 
lucrative source of growth [9]. In many developed 
regions, mobile penetration exceeds the population, the 
greatest example shown by Luxembourg where mobile 
penetration is at 151.61%, although figures around 
90% to 100% are more common [10]. Taking into 
account young children, penetration rates of around 
80% would still equate to a clear majority of adults 
using mobile services. Even in developing countries, 
reports have shown that penetration rates are stabilizing 
at around 80-85% [11]. 
 
3.1 Convenience- communications on the go 
The value proposition of the mobile phone extends 
from the convenience offered by its inherent mobility. 
Its ability to provide location-based, and even location-
aware services, enabling rich communication not 
confined to a single location, affords individuals great 
power and convenience. Without being tied to a 
landline, or to a computer, users can communicate in a 
multitude of ways with others, on the move in a 
completely seamless fashion. Furthermore, new 
technologies such as 3G mobile services are further 
positioning mobile phones as extremely powerful 
mobile computing devices. 
 
3.2 Location ID & the threat of interception 
In a study conducted by Häkkilä and Chatfield [12] 
regarding perceptions of mobile phone privacy, it was 
shown that over 82% of respondents considered their 
mobile phone a “private device.” The mobile phone 
presents a number of unique privacy threats, yet 
interestingly, as indicated by the aforementioned 
statistic, such privacy threats are seldom considered by 
end users [13]. Richtel [14] explains how many citizens 
in the U.S. are completely unaware that government 
authorities can track their movements by monitoring 
the signals that are emitted from the handset. 
In 1994, as O. J. Simpson infamously fled down a 
Los Angeles freeway, he was talking on his mobile 
phone, and engineers were able to use his mobile signal 
to triangulate his position and direct police to his 
location [15]. By 1996, the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) had mandated as 
part of the E-911 initiative that by 2001 mobile carriers 
must be able to identify the location of a caller with 
reasonable accuracy. In the United Kingdom, tracking 
records for mobile phones must be retained by 
providers for at least two years and be available to law-
enforcement agencies when required [16]. Whilst the 
intended use of such tracking information is deemed 
valuable for emergency or law enforcement purposes, it 
is also seen that such data opens the door for mobile 
phone providers to unleash a multitude of location-
based services that take advantage of knowing exactly 
where consumers are located or to generate patterns 
which represent their typical movements. As most 
mobile phone users generally carry their phone on them 
at all times, Charny [17] describes the potential to 
create a highly lucrative market on emerging services 
whereby providers can know the exact locations of 
millions of subscribers at any given time.  
There are a number of methods that can be used to 
track mobile phone users. The first such method [18] is 
“network based,” and involves the triangulation of 
signals by using a number of fixed cellular base-
stations. Such a system however can be impractical for 
wide-scale usage due to bandwidth constraints, and 
furthermore the accuracy of this method is greatly 
affected by cell size, which in rural areas in particular 
can be too great to provide reasonable accuracy. 
Nonetheless, newer 3G mobile networks can provide 
location information at even finer granularity than 
before [19]. Another method involves the use of GPS, a 
feature which many phones are now incorporating. 
According to Best [20], leading manufacturer Nokia 
has already stated that the incorporation of GPS into 
mobile phones will soon be as “ubiquitous as the 
camera phone.” Unlike cell-based triangulation, GPS 
provides greater accuracy and can operate independent 
of the phone itself, meaning that location information 
could be obtained even if the phone is not in use. Many 
services are now being offered around the world 
allowing individuals to track a mobile phone that is 
GPS-enabled via the Internet. Such services are 
typically positioned to parents who wish to monitor 
their children’s activities or to employers who want to 
track where their mobile employees are [14]. Consider 
the case of teacher John Halpin who was given a 
mobile phone by the Department of Education which 
incorporated a GPS tracking device, and who was later 
fired from his position after records revealed 
inconsistencies with the times he had been lodging, 
showing that he was leaving work earlier than stated 
[21]. 
The mobile phone also presents other privacy 
concerns in regard to the interception of signals by 
third parties. Whitaker [15] describes how 
commercially available mobile phone listening devices 
can record multiple conversations and locate the 
geographical position of callers at the same time. 
Importantly, he emphasizes that whilst such products 
are marketed and sold to government agencies and 
telecommunications companies, they can easily find 
their way into the hands of unscrupulous individuals 
who can use them against unsuspecting mobile phone 
users. Many security experts will openly acknowledge 
that all wireless communications are inherently flawed, 
as there will always be the potential for some degree of 
interception [22]. 
 
3.3 Control maintained by opting out 
Theoretically, users can exercise control over other 
parties tracking their location by simply turning off 
their phone. However, in doing so, they prevent access 
to the phone’s features which provide the value in the 
first place. Given the high penetration rates of mobile 
phones throughout the world, it would seem that the 
potential for unwanted third parties to track a mobile 
phone’s location or to intercept the signals transmitted 
by the phone is far outweighed by the value the 
technology offers and its apparent “necessity” for 
living in the modern world.  In the case of the U.S., 
access to mobile phone tracking data is not openly 
accessible to any third parties. Even law enforcement 
agencies must apply for court permission and 
demonstrate “probable cause” that a crime is being 
committed before such information will be released by 
the phone operators [13]. Whilst such controls are put 
in place to protect the privacy of individuals, it is still 
important to recognize that where the technology 
provides the capability, it will almost always be 
exploited in some way by unscrupulous people [15]. 
Furthermore, with such a massive market of mobile 
phone users who increasingly possess ever more 
sophisticated mobile handsets, the potential of offering 
location-based services will most certainly prevail as 
consumers once again become lured by the value such 
services would provide [23]. 
 
4. Case 2: Electronic toll collection 
Electronic toll collection (ETC) systems are now 
widely deployed in most countries throughout the 
world and are the cornerstone for Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS). One of the first such 
systems was implemented in Trondheim, Norway by 
the Q-Free company in 1988 [24]. International ETC 
examples include: TollTrax in India, Hi-Pass in South 
Korea, Autotoll in Hong Kong, E-Pass in Manila, 
Telepass in Italy, Eazy Pass in Ireland, AutoPASS in 
Norway, E-ZPass in north-east USA, and the e-Tag in 
Australia [25]. It would seem that RFID-powered toll 
collection systems are making their way to freeways 
and cities as an effective solution to the ever-increasing 
congestion problem and the necessity to fund new 
roads through the collection of tolls. By 1996 alone, 
there were already several thousand ETC-equipped 
lanes throughout the U.S., Europe and Japan [26].  
An ETC system typically involves the use of an 
RFID powered tag which is placed on an individual’s 
vehicle. As the vehicle passes through a toll plaza, 
RFID readers mounted above the road identify the 
individuals through the RFID tag and will then 
typically deduct the toll amount from their accounts 
[27], [28]. RFID allows the system to operate such that 
drivers do not necessarily have to slow down, and can 
even maintain highway speeds with the tag still being 
read accurately. Advances in technology have also 
facilitated the ability to read tags and deduct tolls even 
in multi-lane free-flow situations; that is where cars are 
not restricted to staying in a single lane and are free to 
change lanes as required [26], [29]. Furthermore, such 
a system can also accurately identify vehicles even in 
dense traffic without requiring direct visibility to the 
license plate as some vehicle-recognition systems 
require [28]. 
 
4.1 No need for cash and less traffic 
Historically, toll payment involved an individual 
stopping their vehicle to pay a collector or place cash 
into an automated collection machine which ultimately 
resulted in congestion [26]. The key value proposition 
that electronic toll collection systems offer is 
convenience and time saving. Such a system eliminates 
the burden to have cash available to make toll 
payments and provides individuals and corporations the 
convenience of an account which can provide better 
tracking of toll expenditure with more convenient 
payment options [30]. In regard to time savings, traffic 
flow is greatly improved and congestion reduced [27]. 
Furthermore, ETC systems have also been shown to 
significantly reduce environmentally harmful emissions 
at toll-collection points by as much as 63 percent [24]. 
Toll operators themselves have seen great value in 
ETC as a means of increasing throughput, generating 
additional revenue, reducing operating costs, and 
improving the level of customer service to road users 
[25].  
 
4.2 Function creep and the loss of anonymity 
The electronic tag which an individual places inside 
their vehicle typically contains at least a unique 
identification number which allows the toll system to 
identify and subsequently charge that individual [25]. 
In some installations, the tag may contain further 
information such as license details, the account 
holder’s name, account details and tag balance. 
Whereas cash payment in the past provided almost 
complete anonymity, electronic toll collection systems 
have opened up the possibility of tracking individuals’ 
movements by monitoring the locations and times when 
the electronic tag is used [31]. In some countries where 
toll roads are common and such systems are 
widespread, drivers’ actions can be inferred in great 
detail simply by monitoring their toll payment 
activities. Caldwell [29] highlights two potential 
privacy concerns with regard to electronic toll 
collection. The first is illegitimate use of drivers’ 
personal information regarding their payment details, 
movement and driving habits that could be accessed if 
electronic records are compromised through a “cyber-
break-in.” This was demonstrated when the New Jersey 
Turnpike electronic toll collection system was 
“hacked” in 2000 by a programmer who worked on the 
system [32]. He was successfully able to view account 
details and usage information for users of one of the 
largest ETC systems in the United States [31].  
The second potential concern is legitimate use of 
such information by government authorities or road 
operators who wish to monitor driving patterns and 
behavior of motorists. This could extend to include 
other potential uses such as traffic surveillance in 
regard to monitoring driver speeds and stolen vehicles 
[24]. Court cases in the U.S. have already demonstrated 
the potential for toll-tracking information to be used to 
verify an individual’s whereabouts and movements. 
The conviction against a nurse in New Jersey, who was 
accused of murdering her husband, was aided by 
E-ZPass toll records which verified to prosecutors 
where she had been, and when [33]. In another 
example, 30 New York police detectives were 
reportedly re-assigned after E-ZPass toll records 
suggested they were making false overtime claims 
based on their driving behavior [34]. 
 
4.3 Towards mandatory electronic collection 
In some installations, cash payment options still 
operate in tandem with electronic toll payment. It is 
becoming increasingly common, however, for 
electronic toll collection systems to become the de 
facto means by which individuals can make their toll 
payment. Studies show that for maximum efficiency, 
ETC systems provide greatest benefit when used in 
isolation, as opposed to hybrid systems which allow 
traditional payment mechanisms [26]. It is becoming 
inherently mandatory for individual’s to install an 
electronic tag in their vehicle if they wish to use 
particular routes or avoid paying higher toll prices if 
they pay by cash [33]. Ultimately in the case of 
electronic toll collection systems, it is apparent that 
convenience is winning out over potential privacy 
threats. For both toll road operators and users, this is 
highlighted by the high growth rates in ETC usage 
around the world [25].  
With an ever-increasing base of tag users, the 
potential for privacy misuse will become more apparent 
over time. As road operators see value in monitoring 
individual driver behavior, to forecast or evaluate 
traffic patterns for instance, individual driver tracking 
may become more prevalent. It should be noted, 
however, that regulatory efforts in many countries can 
still protect ETC users with regard to the usage of their 
personal information. In Australia, for example, the 
Australian Standard AS/4721-2000, Personal Privacy 
Practices for the Electronic Tolling Industry attempts 
to address privacy issues by applying the ten National 
principles for the handling of personal information 
[35]. This standard explicitly recognizes the potential 
commercial use of such toll information and allows for 
such usage provided that the data is “de-identified” and 
made anonymous to protect individuals from 
identification [34]. 
 
5. Case 3: e-Passports 
For centuries, passports have been used as a 
standard means of providing diplomatic protection and 
identification of the bearer when traveling through 
borders and into foreign jurisdictions [36]. The 
passport in the form we know today is the result of 
conferences held following the First World War in 
1920 which sought to standardize passport and visa 
standards for all member states of the League of 
Nations (later The United Nations) [35].  Passport 
standards have been administered by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since 1944. 
Passports, which are referred to by the ICAO as 
Machine Readable Travel Documents, will typically 
contain information such as an individual’s full name, 
nationality, place of residence, place of birth and date 
of birth, with a mandatory full-color photograph. Their 
“machine readable” capability comes from the 
inclusion of a two-line machine readable zone (MRZ) 
of characters in Optical Character Recognition-B style 
that incorporates key information from the passport in a 
manner that can be easily recognized by a machine 
[37]. 
 RFID-enabled passports, which have also been 
termed e-Passports or biometric passports, possess all 
the same information, but in digital form. This includes 
a digitized photograph of the individual which can be 
used to enable biometric comparison through facial 
recognition [38], [39], [40]. It is this facial recognition 
that is the only mandatory, globally interoperable 
biometric for individual identification purposes [41]. 
Although ICAO standards for passports also allow for 
iris or fingerprint data to be used as well, this is at 
present optional [37], [42]. The development of the e-
Passport has also resulted in the development of 
standards which support a worldwide Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). Public Key Cryptography is 
utilized in e-Passports to encrypt the data contained 
within the RFID chip [40]. Digital signatures produced 
by the issuing country ensure the validity, authenticity 
and integrity of data stored in the RFID chip and thus 
theoretically prevent against fraudulent modification, 
copying or access [40]. 
 
5.1 Greater national security 
The drive towards e-Passport adoption was spurred 
directly by the United States and the ICAO. In 2002 the 
U.S. mandated through the Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act 2002, that countries participating in 
their Visa Waiver Program must have provisions in 
place by October 2004 to comply with the biometric 
and document identification standards established by 
ICAO in 2003 [38]. This deadline was extended to 
October 2006 after significant delays caused by 
revisions to the e-Passport’s design [38]. It is important 
to note, however, that moves towards biometrics to 
enable more effective, automated verification of 
individuals was already progressing long before the e-
Passport was given an impetus to introduction. The 
INSPASS system was introduced into the United States 
in the late 1990s as a means of allowing frequent 
visitors to the country unattended, automated entry 
through the use of biometrics to verify identity [43]. 
Whilst the system was discontinued in 2002, it bears a 
striking similarity to much of the same value 
governments and the ICAO have promoted with the e-
Passport. 
The value proposition of the e-Passport is typically 
couched in terms of security and convenience. 
Common claims include the e-Passport’s ability to 
allow automated identity verification, faster 
immigration inspections, and greater border protection 
and security [44]. Whilst it is intended that passports 
will still be read by human personnel to verify the 
information, some countries such as Australia have 
already announced plans to provide self-service kiosks. 
The technology to be used in Australia, referred to as 
SmartGate, has already undergone successful trials in 
2005 and is to commence operation in international 
airports around the country in the near future [45]. 
Such technology, if implemented in airports around the 
world, would allow much quicker processing times of 
passengers for travelers entering the country (Australia 
Customs Service, 2007). Many countries, including the 
UK, have already begun work on similar systems [46].  
The greatest value of the e-Passport as stressed by 
most issuing authorities is the enhancement to security 
they are purported to provide through the digital 
storage of passport information [38]. Certainly, given 
the current level of importance placed on national 
security, governments have been keen to push this 
technology as a means of providing more stringent 
monitoring of individuals entering and exiting the 
country. The use of biometric information, it is 
claimed, will greatly aid in countering identity fraud 
which had become a major issue with traditional 
passports [41]. 
5.2 The risk of identity theft and civil rights 
The privacy concerns surrounding e-Passports are 
primarily related to the ability to access passport 
information without contact, a capability afforded by 
the use of RFID to store the passport’s data contents. It 
is this potential for surreptitious access, perhaps by a 
criminal attempting to commit identity fraud that has 
caused much controversy over e-Passport adoption 
[47]. Potential misuse by the government is particularly 
evident in the controversial USA PATRIOT Act 
introduced just 43 days after 11 September, 2001 
whereby the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation was 
given authority to seize personal information without 
notifying the individual concerned [48]. It is 
theoretically possible for governments to use such acts 
in order to link passport biometric databases with other 
surveillance mechanisms to monitor individuals 
without their awareness [47]. Juels, Molnar and 
Wagner [49] identify six key areas of concern 
regarding privacy and e-Passports: clandestine 
scanning, clandestine tracking, skimming and cloning, 
eavesdropping, biometric data leakage and 
cryptographic weaknesses. Juels [50] also notes the 
threat of function creep. He explains how over time, 
consumer demands for convenience may give way to e-
Passports being used as authenticators for a range of 
consumer transactions. Such a move, it is feared, could 
undermine or erode the data-protection measures that 
have been incorporated to protect privacy and 
furthermore spread such identification information 
amongst more widely divergent systems [48]. 
Given the global reach of e-Passport initiatives, 
there has understandably been much concern raised 
over such privacy issues. Civil rights campaigners in 
particular stress how such e-Passport developments 
have created the potential for a global database 
containing biometric information for over a billion 
people [51]. Interestingly, in development of the U.S. 
passport, open comments by citizens revealed that of 
over 2300 responses, 98.5 percent received were 
negative, and 86 percent were explicitly concerned 
about privacy [38]. Nonetheless, the U.S. e-Passport 
initiative has proceeded, and as of 2006, over 13 
million e-Passports had been issued [52]. Globally, it is 
reported that over 50 million e-Passports have been 
issued, which again emphasizes that despite the privacy 
concerns, the technology has undoubtedly been 
deployed “successfully” [53].  
The media has also been quick to highlight potential 
failures with the technology, demonstrated by the 
exposure given to Lukas Grunwald who successfully 
cloned the U.S. e-Passport and then dumped the 
contents onto an ordinary contactless smart card [54]. 
A further threat was also exposed by Kevin Mahaffey 
and John Hering who demonstrated how an explosive 
device connected to an RFID reader could be triggered 
when a U.S. citizen carrying an e-Passport came within 
reach of the reader [53]. 
 
5.3 Total State control 
Given the mandatory nature of passports there is 
very little individuals can do to avoid using one for 
traveling abroad. As most countries are now issuing e-
Passports, there is also no option for individuals to 
request a non-RFID passport. There is also little an 
individual can do to control how government 
authorities access and use the information on the 
passport when they are entering a foreign country. 
However, beyond the border control point, individuals 
concerned about the privacy threats mentioned earlier 
can still retain some control over their e-Passport by 
ensuring they manage it carefully. Companies such as 
Paraben have already begun marketing “strong hold 
bags”, which are essentially Faraday cages in which a 
passport can be stored when not being used, to provide 
a protective barrier against unwanted third-party access 
[55]. Such a move was even recommended as a means 
of completely preventing unauthorized readings by the 
ICAO itself, who stated that the potential for 
unauthorized reading could not be “completed ruled 
out” [56]. 
 
6. Case 4: Loyalty programs 
Loyalty programs have been in widespread 
existence now since the 1980s, when retail 
organizations began to focus on building lasting 
customer relationships instead of focusing purely on 
short-term profitability [57]. The first modern loyalty 
program was instituted by American Airlines in 1981 
with its “frequent flyer” program [58]. However, such 
programs quickly spread across a range of consumer 
industries including hotels, credit card companies, 
retailers, car rental companies, restaurants and 
entertainment firms [57]. A loyalty program will 
typically involve consumers identifying themselves at 
the retail outlet, usually through a magnetic-swipe or 
bar-coded plastic card, in order to receive immediate or 
delayed benefits for purchasing certain brands or for 
simply using that particular outlet [56]. Astonishingly, 
grocery store loyalty program usage within the United 
States is more widespread than Internet and personal 
computer penetration, with statistics showing that over 
86 percent of adults are members of at least one, and in 
many cases, multiple loyalty programs [59]. In Canada 
that figure is around 97 percent and in the UK, 
penetration had reached 85 percent [60]. 
6.1 Greater consumer rewards 
In the case of loyalty programs, the value 
proposition is critical for encouraging consumer use 
and for developing the brand loyalty which the 
programs aim to achieve. A number of elements are 
described by Yi and Jeon [61] that determine such 
value in a loyalty program. They include: (1) the cash 
value of rewards, (2) the choice of rewards, (3) the 
aspirational value of rewards, (4) the likelihood of 
achieving the rewards, and (5) how easy the loyalty 
scheme is to use. Typical examples of value that loyalty 
programs offer members include discounts on 
individual items or the entire shopping bill, points 
which can be redeemed for a range of rewards such as 
flights, accommodation, homewares, clothing and 
entertainment, and preferential “VIP” treatment. 
Studies conducted by the Boston University College of 
Communication demonstrate that 69 percent of 
consumers believe that their membership in a loyalty 
program benefits them in the form of lower prices and 
special promotions [58]. 
 
6.2 Consumer data profiling and warehousing 
The major privacy threat that extends from the use 
of loyalty programs is the ability to tie purchases of 
specific products to individual consumers and monitor 
their purchasing behavior over time. Retailers collect 
such information to build profiles on their consumers. 
They even admit that such consumer profiles are 
commonly shared and exchanged with “preferred 
partners” [59]. Almost half of people who are members 
of loyalty programs are completely unaware of the 
tracking and monitoring that is occurring by 
participating in such schemes [58]. Moreover, studies 
have shown that consumers will trade their personal 
information if they perceive that the loyalty program is 
providing substantial value to them [58]. A study 
conducted by Graeff and Harmon [62] also found that 
in regard to loyalty programs, consumer perceptions 
were typically positive and most consumers did not 
associate such schemes with the collection and use of 
personal information. Loyalty programs are the 
ultimate demonstration of the trade-off consumers 
make of their privacy in order to gain something of 
value: a benefit, reward, convenience or saving. Given 
the high penetration rates and evident success of these 
programs, it would seem that consumers have been 
easily won over by the premise of “something for 
nothing,” with many oblivious or unconcerned about 
the privacy transaction that they are conducting. 
 
6.3 Opting-in for maximum returns 
A key element of consumer loyalty programs is their 
opt-in nature. As is highlighted by Bosworth [59], 
consumers are not forced into participating in such 
programs and can, if they wish, take their business 
elsewhere, or simply pay cash (minus any potential 
savings the loyalty card may provide). Consumers are 
also given control over their personal information by 
government regulations which in most countries give 
consumers the right to know exactly what information 
retailers are collecting and how it is being used. 
Furthermore, access to such information will typically 
be provided or the information removed altogether if 
requested. Ultimately loyalty programs are about 
choice, and thus given the potential privacy invasion 
that participation in such schemes entails, the value 
proposition is clearly a very important element in 
convincing consumers to participate. It is important to 
note, that whilst loyalty programs involve voluntary 
participation, many such schemes have come under 
criticism for discriminatory pricing, in which non-
members may be unfairly disadvantaged by not 
participating in the scheme [57]. This may ultimately 
drive consumers into participation to avoid being 
forced into paying higher prices or feeling ostracized. 
 
7. Cross-case comparison 
The most important facet common to all of these 
case studies is their dramatic levels of penetration and 
usage. Mobile phone penetration has reached 
remarkable levels, even in developing countries, and in 
many, penetration has grown to over 100%. Electronic 
toll collection is becoming increasingly common as the 
primary means for facilitating toll payments in busy 
cities around the world, with millions of tags now in 
use. E-Passports have become the new standard in 
global identification and have all but replaced 
traditional, chip-less passports in most countries. And 
consumers have embraced loyalty programs 
enthusiastically, with the majority of adults in countries 
such as the U.S., the UK, Canada and Australia, 
actively participating in such schemes. Keeping in 
mind such usage rates, it is also important to note 
another commonality between the mobile innovations, 
that of the presence of a range of privacy threats. It 
would appear given the widespread usage of the cases 
detailed, that privacy has not been a barrier to their 
adoption and consequent acceptance by society. Whilst 
the privacy concerns still exist and indeed, many 
individuals remain concerned about their privacy in 
relation to such technologies and services, on the whole 
it would seem that consumers have accepted each 
technology either because: 
• The value proposition or level of control present, 
balances against the privacy issues (mobile 
phones, electronic toll collection, and loyalty 
programs), or 
• Participation/usage is mandatory and the 
appropriate safeguards to privacy are in place (e-
Passports). 
In the case of the mobile phone, the value has 
become so ubiquitous that it is no longer even thought 
of or discussed. This ubiquity in terms of value would 
explain the lack of concerns consumers have towards 
their privacy in regard to mobile phone usage – it is 
simply not something most people would even think 
about. For electronic toll collection, individuals have 
embraced the convenience aspects presented by the 
technology in regard to simplifying toll payment, and it 
would seem that the simplicity of the technology 
(simply install the tag and forget about it) has again 
resulted in a general lack of concern about privacy 
issues. Loyalty programs are also clearly driven by 
their value proposition, without which, would provide 
little incentive or reason for consumer participation. 
Furthermore, given the amount of personal information 
collected, there must be equally significant value 
provided to ensure consumers feel the scheme is fair. 
Of the four case-studies discussed, the e-Passport is the 
only one where usage is almost completely mandatory 
for those wishing to travel internationally and also 
where individuals have very little control over how 
their e-Passport is used by authorities. In this situation, 
control in the form of legislation guarantees and 
reassures that personal information will be protected. 
 
8. Balancing privacy, value and control 
A key outcome that arises from the case studies 
presented is the varying relationship between these 
three elements and thus the balance each technology or 
service provides. It is clear, that in order to gain 
acceptance, privacy issues must be offset by value and 
control. This trichotomous relationship is illustrated in 
figure 1. In the case of mobile phones, it is evident that 
a somewhat low level of control is acceptable, given 
the relatively low vulnerability of individual privacy 
and the “medium” level of value the technology 
provides. With electronic toll collection, the 
vulnerability of user privacy is depicted to be in the 
“medium” range, yet as users can exercise some degree 
of control over their privacy by removing the tag or 
opting to use alternative routes or payment methods, 
control is depicted as being in the “medium” range. 
This “medium” range in regard to privacy and control, 
is offset by a high level of value evident in the 
convenience the technology affords. With regard to e-
Passports, the provider (i.e. the government) provides 
very little control. Furthermore, the value offered to the 
individual is realistically very low as well. This is 
reflected in the relatively high vulnerability of the 
individual’s privacy which stems not from flaws in the 
technology, but the importance of the information to 
the individual and the consequences that could arise if 
it were compromised by another party. Finally, with 
loyalty programs, a high vulnerability of individual 
privacy which arises from the vast amount of personal 
information collected, is offset by a high level of 
control offered by providers by allowing consumers to 
freely to opt-out of such programs. The privacy risk is 
also further offset by the high level of value which such 
schemes must offer to encourage consumers to 
participate. In the case of mobile phones, electronic toll 
collection and loyalty programs, it is apparent that 
acceptance had to be earned through a favorable 
balance that was offered to consumers. In the case of e-
Passports where the balance is unfavorable (as shown 
in figure 1), acceptance was not generally required as 
the technology was made mandatory by government 




















Figure 1. Privacy-Value-Control trichotomy 
 
10. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to provide a 
“walk” through the privacy-value-control paradigm as 
it applies to a number of mobile innovation. The study 
attempted to show how privacy concerns for specific 
mobile innovations have been offset by strong value 
propositions, or differing levels of control that allows 
the individual to perceive a sense of privacy, or 




How much control does the provider 
offer individuals with the system?
How vulnerable is the 
individual’s privacy?














that has been established by this paper is that a balance 
between privacy, value and control depends largely on 
the individual, the technology and the provider of the 
service; that is, the vulnerability of the individual’s 
privacy, the value inherent in the technology or service, 
and the level of control provided by the service 
provider. What has been highlighted most importantly 
is that privacy is not a barrier to adoption; rather, 
technologies and services will still be accepted and 
used by the population provided that the balance is 
favorable to the individual – whether that be perceived 
or otherwise – unless the technology is mandated into 
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